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NEPA AND TITLE VII:
THE ENVIRONMENT MEETS NEW COMMUNITIES
AT SAN ANTONIO RANCH
WAYT T. WATTERSON*

In 1970, within one year's span of time, two major pieces of congressional legislation were enacted which were widely hailed by planners
and environmentalists as the dawn of a new day in social responsibility
for growth and development in this country. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) 1 2 was intended to instill environmental consciousness in federal agency decision making, while the
Urban Growth and New Community Development Act of 1970 (Title
VII of the Housing and Urban Development Act)' 6 3 sought to stem the
abuses of unrestrained private land development on social, economic,
environmental, and political systems. Of paramount importance was
the effort of both Acts to establish national policy where none had
previously existed, with the federal government as the agent of prime
responsibility. Neither Act has evolved as its sponsors would have
foreseen, but the histories of both reveal a great deal about the potential
development and limitations of public policy in the United States.
NEPA and Title VII were not intended to conflict with one another;
on the contrary, both professed similarly great concern for the physical
and human environment. In fact, the operating provisions of both
could be viewed as being quite compatible-for example, considering
environmental values in the evaluation of new community applications.
But the case of San Antonio Ranch New Town (SAR) demonstrated
that implementing NEPA for Title VII was not so simple, and that
environmental concerns could indeed be in conflict with growth policy
concerns, at least insofar as a federal agency interpreted them.
The litigation that eventually involved SAR-decided in Sierra Club
v. Lynn' -is interesting in several respects, pertaining to both envi* B.A., Williams College; M.R.P., University of North Carolina; head of LongRange Planning Section of the Planning and Community Development Dept., City of
San Antonio, Texas, 1972-1974; currently pursuing doctorate in City and Regional Planning at the University of Pennsylvania.
162. 42 U.S.C. § 4321-55 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. H§ 4321-72 (Supp. II,
1972).
163. 42 U.S.C. §H 4501-32 (1970).

164. 346 F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Tex. 1973), afrd in part, rev'd in part, 502 F.2d 43
(5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994 (1975).
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ronmental concerns and policy relating to new communities. As the
first new community project challenged by a citizen suit on environmental grounds, it became a major legal test of the Title VII program and
the ability of HUD to implement new communities in the face of citizen
and environmental discord. Significantly, however, the history of the
SAR application for HUD assistance spanned a critical period in the
introduction of NEPA provisions into agency operating procedures, and
the experience actually helped to develop HUD regulations regarding
NEPA for new communities. The outcome of the case itself may have
proved an abject defeat for the citizen plaintiffs, but the reality of the
litigation spawned rigorous studies and stringent regulations toward
environmental protection that would not otherwise have existed. Finally, SAR and the procedural and environmental concessions it provoked
from the program administrators on new community development hastened the demise of the Title VII program, which, with the adverse
economic climate and the mountains of built-up HUD red tape, became
almost totally infeasible for private development by 1974, and a financial debacle for HUD soon thereafter.
This paper attempts to evaluate the issues that comprised the SAR
case for their significance in the context of NEPA decisions and for the
New Communities Program. Although this case for NEPA involved
the somewhat singular circumstances of a new community development,
the issues were nevertheless quite typical of NEPA litigation. And
although the Title VII program is at the very least dormant at present,
the SAR experience contains many lessons for other federal programs
that are based on a private-public partnership for development. This
presentation will suggest that the very process of even limited judicial
review of agency actions under NEPA can promote beneficial environmental and procedural effects, although the heightened consciousness of
federal agencies can make traditional private enterprise participation in
developmental programs difficult, if not impossible. Ironically, greater
implementation of the NEPA provisions could actually stimulate more
complete assumption by the federal government of its implicit social
responsibility for important developmental programs like new communities.
THE NEW COMMUNITIES PROGRAM

Federal assistance to new community development dates back to Title
X of the National Housing Act, enacted as Section 201 of the Housing
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and Urban Development Act of 1965,165 which provided mortgage

insurance for certain qualifying private land developments, specifically
including new communities.166 This limited program was expanded
considerably under Title IV of the Housing and Urban Development
Act of 1968,167 which actually created the New Communities Program
as a distinct entity lodged within HUD. The first of the new community
applicants, including SAR, originally filed under Title IV, until the
program was upgraded and incorporated within the Urban Growth and
New Community Development Act, Title VII of the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1970.118
It was significant that the program was included as part of the first
congressional statement of policy on urban growth:
To promote the general welfare and properly apply the resources
of the Federal Government in strengthening the economic and social health of all areas of the Nation and more adequately protect
the physical environment and conserve natural resources, the Congress declares that the Federal Government

. .

. must assume re-

sponsibility for the development of a national urban growth
policy ....

169

The Act then enunciated eight principles for this national urban growth
policy which, by implication of juxtaposition, were ultimate goals for the
New Communities Program.17° Congress also declared that private
new community development had been hampered by the enormous
front-end investment needs, site assembly difficulties, and coordination
problems with the myriad public and private interests involved in any
new community venture. 171
To overcome these constraints and to achieve the stated objectives,
federal guarantees of debt obligations of new community developers
were to be available to assist in financing land aquisition and development and in constructing public facilities. 17a In addition, the Act
provided for supplementary grants of up to 20 percent of project costs to
state and local governments for certain types of federal public facilities
projects in new communities. Eligible projects included transportation,
165.

12 U.S.C. § 1749a (1970).

166. Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1749cc-1 (1970).
167.
168.

42 U.S.C. §§ 3901-14 (1970).
42 U.S.C. §§ 4501-32 (1970).

169. Id. § 4502(c).
170. Id. § 4502(d).
171. Id. § 4511(e).

172. Id.§ 4514.
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health, education, recreation, open space, and water and sewer facilities.173 Additional provisions of the Act included loans, technical
assistance, and planning grants for new community developers.1 74 New
communities were also to have a reserved pool of subsidized housing
program funds. 171 Most of the Act's provisions have never been implemented with congressional appropriations, and most supplementary
grants were terminated with the general HUD program freeze effective
July 1973. The latter, except for housing, have been partially reinstated through the Secretary's discretionary fund authorized by the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974, for which new communities
are eligible.176 Draft regulations for the program were issued in1971,
and proposed for revision in 1972;177 they have never been formally
adopted. The regulations specified criteria for judging new community
eligibility for Title VII and procedures for applications, for which
detailed guidelines were also issued. One element of the regulations of
particular significance isthe proposed "[a]dherence to the policies of
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and any regulations
promulgated thereunder.' 17 Few other environmental criteria or procedures were included.
Four basic types of new communities were identified for which Title
VII assistance may be applied. These are:
(1) Satellite-economically balanced new communities within
metropolitan areas, representing effective alternatives to
urban sprawl;
(2) Add-on-additions to existing small towns and cities capable of conversion to growth centers;
(3) New towns in-town-compact subcities within or adjacent
to existing cities which can assist the renewal of central
cities; and
(4) Free-standing-frontier new

communities

distant

from

urban areas, heterogeneous and economically self-sufficient
new towns to accommodate population growth.179

173. Id. § 4519, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 4519 (Supp. II, 1972).
174. Id. §§ 4515, 4520, 4521.

175. Id. § 4519, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 4519 (Supp. If, 1972).
176. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5301-17 (Supp. 1976).

177. HUD DRAFT REGULATIONS: ASSISTANCE FOR NEW COMMUNmES, 24 C.F.R.
§ 32 (1971), revised, 24 C.F.R. § 720 (1972).
178. Id. § 32.7(c)(4). See also id. § 32.23(b)(2).
179. See 3 U.S. CODE CONo. & AD. NEWS, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5582, 5587-88
(1970); HUD DRAFT REGULATIONS:

§ 32:7(d) (1971).

ASSISTANCE FOR NEW CoMMuNITIEs, 24 C.F.R.
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A fifth category added in 1972 was paired new communities--either
satellite or in-town developments linked together in management services and transportation.18 Of the 17 new communities approved for
federal loan guarantees to date, all but three are satellite communities.
The Program has been administered by the Office of New Communi-

ties Development (ONCD) in HUD, now called the New Communities
Administration. Prior to any new community assistance, the ONCD
(together with other HUD offices) conducts a thorough review of

proposed project plans to ensure compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements. A favorable review culminates in official approval
by the board of directors of the Community Development Corporation
within HUD.18 1 The offer of commitment is then made to the develop-

er of the new community, usually with a specific guarantee ceiling
amount. After official acceptance by the developer of the offer, the
terms and conditions under which both HUD and the developer must

operate are negotiated and set forth in a project agreement, including a
general development plan, and trust indenture, both legal and binding

on all parties.' 2
San Antonio Ranch was the eighth new community of the 17 approved by HUD under the New Communities Program. 8 3 The total
180.
181.
pointed
182.
§ 32.24

1.
2.
3..
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

24 C.F.R. § 720.6(b) (1972).
42 U.S.C. § 4532 (1970). The board consists of five members who are apby the President and the Secretary.
HUD DiRFr REOULATIONS: ASSISTANCE FOR NEW COMMUNITIES, 24 C.F.R.
(1971).
TITLE VII NEW COMMUNITIES
Name
State
General Location
Date of Amount of
Offer Guarantee
Jonathan
Minnesota
(near Minneapolis)
2/70 $21,000,0(30
St. Charles Comm. Maryland
(near Wash., D.C.)
6/70 24,000,0 00
Park Forest South Illinois
(near Chicago)
6/70 30,000,0
Flower Mound
Texas
(between Dallas/Ft Worth) 12/70 18,000,0(30
Maumelle
Arkansas
(near Little Rock)
12/70
7,500,0( 0
Ceder-Riverside
Minnesota
(in Minneapolis)
6/71 24,000,0 0
Riverton
New York
(near Rochester)
12/71 12,000,0( 0
San Antonio Ranch Texas
(near San Antonio)
2/72 18,000,04 0
30
The Woodlands
Texas
(near Houston)
3/72 50,000,0 00
Gananda
New York
(near Rochester)
4/72 22,000,0 30
Soul City
North Carolina (north of Raleigh-Durham) 6/72 14,000,0( 30
Radissona
New York
(near Syracuse)
6/72
c 0
Harbison
South Carolina (near Columbia).
10/72 13,000,0(
Roosevelt Islandb
New York
(in New York)
12/72
c 0
Shenandoah
Georgia
(near Atlanta)
2/73 40,000,0(
Newfields
Ohio
(near Dayton)
10/73 32,000,0 0
Beckett
New Jersey
(near Phila., Pa.)
10/73
d
a Formerly Lysander.
b Formerly Welfare Island.
c Projects of New York State Urban Development Corp.-eligible for grant
assistance but not loan guarantees.
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thus far approved falls far short of the original HUD target of 10
communities per year, and does not even approach the limits of guarantee commitments of $500 million imposed by the Act. 84 No new
communities were approved during 1974-75, and at the end of the year
a moratorium was declared by HUD on all new applications and approvals under the Title VII program, pending a complete re-evaluation of the
program. Many studies, mostly critical of the program and its administration, have been completed recently and congressional hearings have
been held on the subject. Overall, the recession of 1974, high interest
rates, energy uncertainties, and inflation of costs have endangered most
large-scale real estate developments, and have demonstrated severe financial weaknesses in several Title VII new communities, which has led
to some renegotiation of loan guarantee amounts and the threat of noncompliance suits by both HUD and developers." 5 Title VII developers,
organized as the League of New Community Developers, have blamed
HUD for their problems-the ever-increasing guidelines, scrutiny, and
time delays involved in the application process, as well as unfulfilled
promises for supplementary grants and other assistance. Apparently,
the future of,the New Communities Program is quite bleak at this point.
THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF

1969

NEPA established for the first time a national policy for the management and preservation of the environment. The substantive responsibilities of the federal government for the achievement of the stated environmental goals are set forth in section 101 of the Act. 8 6
To ensure that the "continuing responsibility" will be actively assumed by all federal agencies, section 102 specifically directs that a
systematic and interdisciplinary approach be utilized in order to
achieve integrated decision making.' 8 7 Congress expressly created a
duty of compliance with the environmental policy, but restricted it to the
individual compliance of each agency without any higher review and
d

Offer of loan guarantees and assistance not accepted by developer.
& R. WATTERSON, ThE POLITICS OF NEw COMMUNITIES: A

W. WATrERSoN

OF SAN ANTONIO RANCH 6

CASE STUDY

(1975).

184. 42 U.S.C. § 4514(e) (1970).
185. See 2 HoUSINO & DEv. REP. 1180 (April 21, 1975).
186. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970) states:
In order to carry out the policy set forth in this Act, it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent with other
essential considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans,
functions, programs, and resources ....
187. Id. § 4332.
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approval by a watchdog group, definitely not the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ). The legislative history of the NEPA leaves no
doubt that both substantive and procedural ("action-forcing") obligations were intended for all federal agencies.' 88
The legislative history is unclear as to whether the Act establishes any
right of individuals to a healthful environment and whether the policies
and the duties imposed by the Act are subject to judicial review. With
respect to the former, such language was intentionally removed from an
early version, but some observers have argued that constitutional guarantees of the fifth, fourteenth and ninth amendments create such a
right.'8 9 As for judicial review, NEPA is ambiguous with regard to
whether jurisdiction for review is implicitly conferred by the Act or
whether review is possible only insofar as justified under the Administrative Procedure Act or other statutes.' 90 The trend of the courts is to
choose the latter basis for NEPA review, not only because it is legally
the safer course, but also because NEPA is congruent with such existing
factors as the changing mood of the nation on environmental concern
and the diminishing standards of review of agency decision-making
procedures by courts generally.'
Despite such favorable conditions, the history of NEPA's implementation has been limited basically to review of compliance with section
102. The CEQ first issued guidelines for federal agency compliance
with NEPA in 1971192 but from the start these were not regulatory and
have been generally restricted to section 102(2)(C), merging most of
the broad action-forcing provisions of section 102 into the subsection's
impact statement process, a substantial distortion of accepted NEPA
intent. As a result, judicial review of NEPA has chiefly focused on:
(1) agency determinations on whether or not to prepare impact statements ("threshold"); (2) the adequacy of impact statements ("full
disclosure"); and (3) utilization of the environmental information in
decision making. Only rarely has review been extended to conform188. See S. Rep. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969); H.R. Rep. No. 91-765,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
189. See F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLIcY AcT 15 (1973); Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The

Citizen Suit and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 RUTGERs L. REV.
230 (1970).
190. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1970).
191. F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY Acr 22 (1973).

192. CEQ, Statements on Proposed Federal Actions Affecting the Environment, 36
Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971), revised, 38 Fed. Reg. 20551 (1973).
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ance of the decision itself to the environmental policies and other
information available.' 98
The impact statement process required by the CEQ guidelines generally involves agency preparation of a draft environmental impact statement (EIS), disseminating it to relevant public agencies and private
parties, and revising the draft and including the comments to form a
final EIS, which is submitted -tothe CEQ. This lengthy and expensive
process encourages the most restrictive possible definition of "major
Federal actions" and the use of the EIS as an ex post facto justification
of decisions already taken. These threshold and timing characteristics
have provided the greatest point of vulnerability for citizen suits to
enjoin federal projects, pending minimal procedural compliance with
NEPA. The history of NEPA cases reveals a continual broadening of
EIS procedural requirements, but only the inception of a concern for the
policy compliance of agency decisions.
HUD first responded to NEPA with an initial version of circular
1390.1 in July 1971, which established a set of procedures and forms
for evaluating threshold impact questions on the, myriad HUD
projects. 94 The fact that only a few projects proceeded to the final
requirement of an EIS is disclosed in CEQ figures: from a total of 5,034
impact statements filed through mid-1974, HUD prepared only 84 for
its diverse projects. 95 New communities were determined to be major
actions by 1972, but other types of HUD activities, ranging all the way
down to small subdivisions for mortgage insurance, were evaluated on a
case-by-case basis. HUD seldom has been challenged in court under
NEPA; only five of those cases have reached the U.S. Court of Appeals
level-two on subsidized housing, 196 two on urban renewal, 97 and the
case of San Antonio Ranch New Town.' 98
SAN ANTONIO RANCH

NEw TOWN

SAR consists of 9,318 acres and is located in northwestern Bexar
193. F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS: A LEoAL ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 24-26 (1973).
194. DEPARTMENTAL POLICIES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND PROCEDURES FOR PROTECTION
AND ENHANCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, HUD Circular No. 1390.1 (July,
1971), as revised, April, December 1972, and July 1973.
195. CEQ, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 1974, FIFTH ANN. REP. 390 (1974).

196. Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282 (1st Cir. 1973); Hiram Clarke Civic Club v.
Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973).
197. Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885 (1st Cir. 1973); San Francisco'Tomorrow v. Romney, 472 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1973).
.198. Sierra Club v.. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994
(1975).
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County, Texas, approximately 20 miles from downtown San Antonio.
The site is generally hilly and rocky, and lies directly over a portion of
the Edwards Underground Aquifer, a large subsurface reservior that
provides almost all of San Antonio's water. Part of the site lies on the
direct recharge area for the aquifer, which consists of porous limestone
and geological faults through which precipitation and surface waters
reach the aquifer. This site is also located near the new University of
Texas at San Antonio and the South Texas Medical Center.
SAR plans call for a 30-year development period and an ultimate
population of 87,972, with a full range of land uses and providing
17,660 jobs in the community. A wide variety of housing types,
including 25 percent which are to be subsidized, is to be built at SAR,
and a special mass transit link between the town center and downtown
San Antonio has been proposed but not funded. 199
The SAR site is entirely outside of the corporate limits of any municipality, but as of April 1974, it lies fully within the extra-territorial
jurisdiction of the City of San Antonio. 00 Consequently, San Antonio
has authority to approve subdivison platting, as well as power over
annexation and incorporation, for the entire SAR site. Also, San
Antonio in many cases supplies public utilities including electricity, gas,
water, and sewer to the area in which SAR is located. Schools in the
area are a function of the Northside Independent School District. Bexar
County, on the other hand, provides few services and has almost no
powers of land use control.
Three different and overlapping modes of governance have been
proposed for SAR: a municipal utility district (MUD), annexation by
the City of San Antonio, and a local citizens association. The MUD,
approved in December 1973 by the Texas Water Rights Commission,
covers 3,166 acres (the earliest stages of development), and, through a
board of directors appointed by the developers, has authorized the
issuance of $26.9 million in bonds to finance infrastructure costs. As in
any annexation by the city, the bonds will be a taxable obligation of all
property owners within the MUD.2"' In a resolution of February 1972,
the City Council of San Antonio expressed its intent to annex SAR at an
appropriate time in the future. 20 2 In a related contractual but non199. HUD, ADDENDUM TO FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, PROPOSED
NEW COMMUNITY OF SAN ANTONIO RANCH NEW TowN, BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS 19-25
(Aug. 24, 1972).
200. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 970a, § 3 (1963).
201. TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 54.001-.738 (1972).

202. San Antonio, Tex., City Council Resolution No. 72-7-9 (Feb. 10, 1972).
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binding agreement with SAR, the council promised to supply utilities to
SAR even if not annexed.2"' The formation and role of the proposed
citizens association has not yet been delineated.
The Edwards Aquifer extends west-to-east through six counties, from
Brackettville to Kyle. The direct recharge zone of the aquifer covers
some 100 square miles of Bexar County, along the northern edge of San
Antonio, with less than one percent of this area developed as of 1972.
The few legal restrictions on development over the recharge zone that
were in existence at the time of the SAR approvals were embodied in a
1970 Edwards Order of -the Texas Water Quality Board (TWQB),
20 4
which order chiefly concerned densities and permits for septic tanks.
Largely due to SAR, the TWQB issued an amended Edwards Order in
1974, which extended controls to private sewage systems and set standards for effluent discharges within the recharge zone. Other public
agencies in the region charged with ensuring the quality of water
resources include the Edwards Underground Water District and the San
Antonio River Authority.
The SAR development team applied to HUD for assistance under the
New Communities Program in November, 1970. The required A-95
approval through the Alamo Area Council of Governments (AACOG)
was obtained in May 1971, after some debate over environmental
concerns resulting from the project.2"5 The draft environmental impact
statement, published in September 1971, engendered a torrent of environmentalist opposition to the project, including at first the San Antonio
City Council and the Bexar County Commissioners. The Draft EIS
hardly mentioned the aquifer, dismissed sewage as an easily solvable
effect, examined no alternatives, and included only marginal grazing
land as resource commitments in the project. 20 6 The report was identifiably the work of the developer team, not HUD. And not a single
state, regional, or local agency except AACOG was on the distribution
list for review and comments on the Draft EIS.
The SAR issue became a cause celebre for opposition on environmental issues and urban versus suburban federal funding grounds. Finally,
however, the City Council, under heavy political pressure, reversed its
203. SAN ANTONIO, TEx., ORDINANCE No. 40358 (Feb. 3, 1972), amended, ORDINANCE No. 40397 (Feb. 17, 1972).
204. Tex. Water Quality Bd., Order No. 70-0731-12 (1970).
205. Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-95 (July 24, 1969), (revised Feb.
9, 1971), (revised Nov. 13, 1973).
206. See HUD, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, PRoPosED NEw COMmuNrrY OF SAN ANTONIO RANCH, BExA CouNTY, TEXAS (Jan. 20, 1972).
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position on SAR in early 1972.207 The final EIS published in January
1972 was an improvement primarily in comprehensiveness and in the
point-by-point rebuttals of the many solicited and unsolicited comments
to the draft.20 8 The HUD Community Development Corporation decided to approve the SAR application even prior to the end of the 30-day
final EIS circulation period and on February 23, 1972, the decision was
announced. The HUD offer of commitment was for $18 million in loan
guarantees, but was made conditional on the completion of further
scientific studies concerning environmental impacts.20 9
210
On the day of the announcement, four local citizens' groups,
followed by Bexar County and the Edwards Underground Water District, filed suit in federal district court to block implementation of SAR.
The named defendants were HUD and the SAR developers, who were
joined later by the TWQB. In March 1972, Judge Adrian A. Spears
agreed to hold the suit in abeyance while the studies were conducted,
since all parties agreed that 'the final EIS was inadequate. 211 The
developers commissioned studies and convened the SAR Water Quality
Advisory Review Board, composed of public agencies, to review the
findings. The studies became the basis for the addendum to the final
EIS, published in August 1972, which included all previous materials as
well. The addendum was a precisely written, reasonably complete
document, buttressed by the study findings and a HUD geological
consultant, but arguably deficient in some NEPA section 102(2) (C)
categories.2 12 After 30 days, HUD decreed the conditions met and
authorized the execution of a project agreement.2 1
The trial itself opened in San Antonio on April 30, 1973, and
conprised nine days of testimony, chiefly from water quality scientists
and urban planners. The decision in May fully exonerated the defend207. See W. WATrERSON & R. WATrERSON, THE PoLITIcs OF NEW COMMUNITIES:
A CASE STUDY OF SAN ANTONIO RANCH 22-26, 60-70 (1975).
208. See HUD, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, PROPOSED NEW COMMUNITY OF SAN ANTONIO RANCH, BExAR COUNTY, TEXAs (Jan. 20, 1972).
209. HUD NEWS, No. 72-131 (Feb. 28, 1972).
210. These groups were: the Sierra Club, South Texas Group; Citizens for a Better
Environment; League of Women Voters, San Antonio Area; and American Association
of University Women, San Antonio Branch.
211. Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Tex. 1973), affd in part, rev'd
in part, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994 (1975).
212. See HUD, ADDENDUM TO FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, PROPOSED NEW COMMUNITY OF SAN ANTONIO RANCH NEW TOWN, BEXAR COUNTY, T.4s
19-25 (Aug. 24, 1972).
213. W. WATIERSON & R. WATTERSON, TE POLITICS OF NEW COMMUNITIES: A
CASE STUDY OF SAN ANTONIO RANCh 39 (1975).
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ants, but, with the sympathy of the judge clearly for the plaintiffs, the
environmentalists' court costs were assessed against the SAR developers
and the court retained jurisdiction to prevent any reneging on responsibilities.2 14 After motions for rehearing were denied, all of the results
were appealed by the respective aggrieved parties to the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in New Orleans. The injunction on
construction activity at SAR which the plaintiffs sought was denied.
Finally, on October 4, 1974, the Court of Appeals handed down its
decision, affirming the lower court in dismissing all challenges to SAR's
development and reversing Judge Spears on the attorneys' fees and the
retention of jurisdiction. s15 Certiorari was denied by the United States
Supreme Court, thus finally ending the long legal struggle.
San Antonio Ranch New Town can be viewed as an excellent idea in
the wrong place. The plans are worthy, the justification sound and the
implementation mechanisms at least feasible. But what is to prevent
this limited utopia from causing an environmental catastrophe of the
first order? The studies and precautionary measures adopted for SAR
certainly rank with the most sophisticated and stringent yet produced,
but the inherent danger still exists. Although the SAR developers and
their HUD sponsors had to be forced to carry out the extreme steps of
protection, the final plans by themselves may be considered efficacious
by current standards.
In actuality, however, the environmental problems seemed less subject
to scientific and technological solution than to legal and administrative
recourse. SAR, as a potent political application surfacing in 1970, was
reviewed by HUD with the resignation of a fait accompli, but this was
before Title VII linked the New Communities Program to national
urban growth policy and before the evolution of NEPA requiring more
careful and open decision making, if not more environmentally correct. 211 The implementation of these laws and their administrative
fallout worked wonders on the SAR project between 1970 and 1974,
but ultimately failed either to create an optimal solution for San Antonio's growth or to ensure the protection of its water supply. The
benefits of Title VII and NEPA are indisputable in the SAR case, but
214. Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834, 852 (W.D. Tex. 1973), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994 (1975).
215. Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43, 67 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.

994 (1975).
216. See W. WATrERSON & R. WATIERSON, THE POLITICS oF NEw COMMUNITIES:
A CASE STuDy OF SAN ANTONIO RANCH 81-86 (1975).
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their shortcomings are also unmistakable and symbolize the deficiencies
of current public policy on urban and environmental matters. These
points are emphasized by an analysis of the legal issues involved in the
SAR controversy, particularly with regard to matters related to NEPA
and Title VII statutes.

NEPA AND SAR
Although NEPA was implemented for the most part subsequent to
the filing of the SAR application with HUD, its provisions nevertheless
applied to SAR for the HUD review and approval process.2 17 There are
no threshold questions involved with the SAR application because HUD
promptly determined that all new communities qualified as major federal actions. But the HUD decision on SAR can be challenged on several
other grounds, generally categorized as follows: (1) procedural irregularities in carrying out the required EIS process for SAR; (2) inadequacy of the final EIS (the addendum) according to the NEPA requirements; (3) insufficient consideration of environmental information in
the decision to approve SAR; and possibly (4) inconsistency of lUD's
decision to approve SAR with the environmental information at hand, in
violation of the NEPA policy. The first three were advanced in Sierra
Club v. Lynn, and were rejected by both the trial and appellate
courts

2 18

ProceduralIrregularities
Because of the novelty of the EIS process for HUD and because of a
general awareness of the sensitivity of the SAR project both environmentally and politically, HUD allegedly made some errors in the preparation and timing of the impact statements. The appellate court evaluated the arguments on each of these irregularities and concluded that
compliance had been accomplished since the evidence was less than
conclusive for proof of error.21 It is debatable in any event whether a
finding of procedural error would be enough to grant the plaintiffs'
prayer of blocking SAR implementation rather than merely delaying the
project while the proper steps were followed de novo.
217. CEQ, Statements on Proposed Federal Actions Affecting the Environment, 36
Fed. Reg. 7729 (1971), revised, 38 Fed. Reg. 20551 (1973).
218. Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Tex. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd
.1
in part,502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994 (1975).
219. Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43, 58-59 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
994 (1975).
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Strong circumstantial evidence existed that HUD almost totally delegated to the SAR developers the job of preparing the official impact
statements. NEPA legislation and the CEQ and HUD guidelines on the
NEPA implementation clearly demand that federal agencies themselves
prepare every EIS. The leading case on this aspect of EIS preparation
is Greene County Planning Board v. FPC, 2 ° in which the court concluded:
The Federal Power Commission has abdicated a significant part
of its responsibility by substituting the statement of [the applicant]
for its own. The Commission appears to be content to collate the
comments of other federal agencies, its own staff and the intervenors and once again to act as an umpire. The danger of this
procedure, and one obvious shortcoming, is the potential, if not
likelihood, that the applicant's statement will be based on selfserving assumptions.2 2 1
HUD has previously been guilty of the same practices:
[T]he agency charged with environmental responsibility [HUD]
appears to have done virtually nothing except to take the promoter's worksheet at face value and endorse it without independent
investigation.2 2
The preponderance of interpretation prohibits the delegation by agencies of EIS preparation, and actually requires independent technical
evaluation, including separate studies.
The courts in Lynn accepted HUD's testimony that agency personnel
wrote the statements and that its consultant scrupulously reviewed developer environmental studies."' The charge of EIS delegation thus failed
for lack of factual evidence, which is very difficult for parties outside of
agencies to obtain. In addition, even if the procedural allegations could
be proven against HUD, the resulting action would probably only be
another temporary halt until more studies and another EIS could be
completed, still begging the substantive questions.
Another major procedural issue in the SAR case was the timing of the
HUD approval of SAR vis-a-vis the EIS preparation and promulgation.
Timing entered the SAR case on two counts: (1) HUD's decision to
approve the SAR application preceded the required 30-day circulation
220. 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972).
221. Id. at 420.

222. Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877, 880 (D. Ore.
1971).
223. Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43, 59-60 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
994 (1975).
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period for the final EIS; and more substantively, (2) the final EIS was
admitted by HUD to be inadequate after the offer of commitment had
been made to SAR. Regarding the former, HUD sent a "draft" letter of
commitment to the developers well in advance of the expiration of the
30-day circulation period. The draft letter, almost a verbatim facsimile
of the final letter, represented the decision of the Community Development Corporation to approve SAR, in violation of HUD regulations in
circular 1390.1 and CEQ guidelines:
The Final Environmental Impact Statement shall be filed with the
CEQ and made available to appropriate agencies and to the public
at least thirty (30) days prior to HUD approval of, or commitment
to, the proposed action.2 24
Such contravention of supposedly. standard procedural requirements
violates the intent of NEPA that environmental information become an
integral part of agency decision making. Nevertheless, the appellate
court dismissed this allegation by insisting that the CEQ guidelines,
"although highly persuasive, do not govern compliance with NEPA,"22 5
and stating that the only relevant letter of committment was that sent
following the 30-day period-the clear intention of the Community
Development Corporation decision-makers.
As for the charge that the final EIS was admittedly faulty and the
decision therefore untimely, again it must be pointed out that NEPA,
the CEQ guidelines, and the HUD Regulations on NEPA all envision
the completion of an acceptable EIS prior to major decisions on any project. Contravention of the letter and spirit of NEPA and its regulations
has been judicially censured before:
Subsequent drafts . . . obviously did not correct the situation,
since the final agency decision as to location of the highway had
already been made. The environmental impact statement was intended by Congress to provide decision-making bodies with sufficient information to make an environmentally sound decision, not
to offer evidence of the wisdom of that decision once it has been

made. 226

Not only was the final EIS admittedly deficient, but HUD did not even
hire its consultant to evaluate the developer environmental studies until
224.

DEPARTMENTAL

POLICIES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND

PROCEDURES FOR PROTECTION

HUD Circular No. 1390.1, § 5d(2)
(b) (July 1971) (revised, Apr. .1972, Dec. 1972, July 1973).
225. Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43, 58 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
994 (1975).
226. Daly v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 252, 259 (W.D. Wash. 1972), affd, 514 F.2d 1106
(9th Cir. 1975).

AND ENHANCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
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two months after the offer of commitment. HUD nevertheless steadfastly refused to withdraw the offer. 21 7 The order of events in the
approval process greatly enhanced the potential for the environmental
assessment and ultimate statement to become a post hoc rationalization
of a decision already made and irrevocable. This is certainly not the
intent of NEPA.
The appellate court, however, justified HUD's actions as legitimate
because the CEQ Guidelines could be interpreted as requiring only a
draft EIS prior to the first major decision, and because the status quo on
the project was in fact maintained until the studies and the addendum
were completed, thus meeting every stipulated district court and the
NEPA condition.
Post-submission efforts to rehabilitate the statement to comport
with NEPA's provisions or to minimize adverse environmental
consequences and maximize benefits should not be barred by initial inadequacies. .

.

. [A]n initial finding of section 102 non-

compliance must not irrevocably preclude eventual compliance.
HUD's compliance with NEPA must be measured by the contents
of the
final impact statement as supplemented by the later adden2 28
dum.
Following this logic there would be little incentive for agency compliance with NEPA at any point at all until specifically challenged in court
on a case-by-case basis, and then it would be only a matter of time
until eventual compliance.
EIS Adequacy

Although several other issues of importance relate to the addendum
to the EIS for SAR-such as failure of HUD to examine induced
environmental impacts, to set out a cost-benefit analysis of the project,
to fully consider outside comments-the greatest significance for NEPA
and HUD lies in the treatment of alternatives to the SAR project. In its
final EIS of January 1972, HUD included only two pages on "alternatives to the proposed action," concluding from the "analysis" that the
new town was "by far the best alternative."22 9 The addendum, al227. Testimony of A.P. DeVito, Trial Transcript p. 1623, Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364
F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Tex. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994 (1975).
228. Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43, 60 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
994 (1975).
229. HUD, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, NopoSED NEW COMMUNITY
oF SAN ANToNio RANCH, BEXAR COUNTY, TExAs 50-52 (Jan. 20, 1972).
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though covering the topic in much greater detail, was still limited to
three basic alternatives: (a) taking no action, (b) requiring actions of a
significantly different nature, that is, another location which would
provide similar benefits with different environmental impacts, and (c)
different designs or details of the proposed action which would present
different environmental impacts. No action would leave unsolved the
inevitable growth problem, another location would leave the aquifer
recharge zone vulnerable to unplanned development, and a different
2 30
design would probably be less environmentally sensitive.
Consideration of alternatives has from the start been a critical component of agency compliance with NEPA, especially in impact statements.2 81 A thorough listing of alternatives must be accompanied by a
detailed analysis of impacts so that a reasoned choice can be made.2" 2 In
addition, all reasonable alternatives must be considered, even if outside
of the agency's purview.2 3 The CEQ guidelines indicate the proper
range and depth of alternatives analysis:
A rigorous exploration and objective evaluation of alternative actions that might avoid some or all of the adverse environmental
effects is essential. Sufficient analysis of such alternatives and
their costs and impact on the environment should accompany the
proposed action through the agency review process in order not
to foreclose prematurely
options which might have less detri234
mental effects.
Even the addendum EIS for SAR failed to adhere to the standards
outlined above for description and analysis of potential alternatives.
First, the consideration of the alternatives did not occur until the decision making was completed, thus indicating an effort at justification
230. HUD, ADDENDUM TO FiNAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, PROPOSED
NEW COMMUNITY OF SAN ANTONIO RANCH NEW TowN, BExAR CoUNTY, TEXAS 92-102

(Aug. 24, 1972).
231. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1128 (D.C.
Cir. 1971). See also Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d
693, 697-98 (2d Cir. 1972).
232. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 350 (8th Cir.
1972).
233. Sierra Club v. Froehike, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
The fact that some reasonably related alternative might require Congressional legislation is not sufficient either to place it beyond the consideration of the agency or
beyond inclusion in the impact statement. Likewise, the fact that a particular alternative would require substantial coordination with another federal agency is not
sufficient, in and of itself, to place its consideration beyond the requirements of
NEPA.
id. at 1344. See also Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
234. CEQ, Statements on Proposed Federal Actions Affecting the Environment, 36
Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971).
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rather than honest inquiry. Second, the presentation of alternatives
lacked the rigorous analysis of potential impacts, including costs and
benefits, that guidelines and precedents seem to demand. And third,
several obvious alternatives to the proposed action are inexplicably
absent from the discussion in the addendum EIS.
In the alternative of "no action," the rationale offered is the dubious
contention that the development of SAR will protect the recharge zone
from otherwise inevitable uncontrolled development. This argument is
analogous to a "destroy-in-order-to-save" proposition. Not only would
SAR cause incremental pollution to the aquifer at least as great as
smaller scattered development, but the expected induced parasitical
development contiguous to it could amount to uncontrolled development
up to 40,000 persons. Just what might happen was not rigorously
assessed. For exampile, the development in 'the ,absence of SAR would
not be inevitable if public action, assisted by HUD, forestalled it or controlled it. The Texas Water Quality Board regulation, enactment of
county zoning, annexation by the City of San Antonio, or purchase as
open space are a few obvious alternatives. These, in fact, should have
been discussed as separate alternatives to the proposed HUD action
on SAR.
These missing alternatives are not too unreasonable for consideration,
for the effects are as ascertainable as those of SAR and implementation
is only as remote as public policy permits.2"' Acquisition and preservation of the aquifer recharge zone had been a serious proposal by
responsible citizens, including United States Representative Henry B.
Gonzalez and has since been started by a local group with private
donations.2 3 6 Although expensive, it was neither unreasonable nor unforeseeable at the time of the EIS preparation; with federal assistance it
would be less so. HUD made no attempt to study the feasibility of such
an alternative.
Control over the inevitable development in the recharge area was also
not discussed as a viable alternative. To discourage the development of
new subdivisions and other projects on the recharge zone of the aquifer,
HUD and other federal agencies could modify such assistance programs
235. Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 961 (1974). The court stated that "there is no need for an [impact statement]
to consider an alternative whose effect cannot be reasonably ascertained, and whose implementation is deemed remote and speculative." Id. at 472.
236. W. WATrERSON & R. WATrEMSON, THE PoLITIcs OF NEW COMMUNITIES:
CASE STUDY OF SAN ANTONIO RANCH 31 (1975).
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as FHA and VA insurance. Extension of land use controls by state and
local governments was likewise not unforeseeable, especially with HUD
encouragement. These measures are reasonable possibilities for averting the so-stated inevitable development in the absence of SAR, and
they deserved discussion and analysis in the EIS.
The problems of alternative sites and other feasible action raise the
question of the meaning of alternatives for NEPA. In National Resources Defense Council v. Morton23 7 the court established the principle
of policy objectives for NEPA alternatives stating that "[w]hen the
proposed action is an integral part of a coordinated plan to deal with a
broad problem, the range of alternatives that must be evaluated is
2 a8
broadened.
The court was referring to oil and gas leases as part of the overall
energy policy. The analogy is quite striking to SAR and Title VII:
HUD is charged both with growth policy to curb urban sprawl and with
approving new community assistance. To view a new community
project like SAR in isolation-neglecting other advantageous sites for
growth in the area and other means of protecting the aquifer-is to
ignore the range of options available to achieve statutory objectives. In
the past HUD has responded in urban renewal to the statutory objectives
of slum clearance and prevention, and not restricted itself to construction of specific re-use facilities like office buildings.23 9 What was
missing in the SAR impact statements was a similar linkage between
objectives and alternatives as mandated in NEPA and case precedent.
The district and appellate courts in Lynn, however, rejected all arguments challenging the sufficiency of the addendum EIS. Although
admitting that "the scope and extent of HUD's treatment of alternatives
was less than exhaustive,"2 40 the court nevertheless decided there was
reasonable compliance with NEPA. The court, in effect, appeared to
be persuaded by the volume of materials finally assembled by HUD and
the developers. 2 4' This conclusion is inconsistent not only with the
237. 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
238. Id. at 835.
239. See Picher, Alternatives Under NEPA: The Function of Objectives in an
Environmental Impact Statement, 11 HARV. J. LEG Is. 595, 607 (1974).
240. Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43, 62 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
994 (1975).
241. Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 832 (W.D. Tex. 1973), aft'd in part, rev'd
in part, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994 (1975). The court
in Lynn stated that
the Environmental Impact Statement ... is sufficient to permit a reasoned decision
as to the environmental effects of SAR. This is especially true if one reads the
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facts and precedent, but with 'the needs of urban and environmental
policy as well. 24 2 Thus it is submitted that the courts erred in Lynn in
focusing on the SAR project, rather than on legislatively set policy
objectives.
HUD Decision to Approve SAR
This is the most important issue of the NEPA interpretation, where
most cases are won or lost. The matters in the SAR case discussed so
far, while important, could of themselves probably only delay further
implementation of the project. Review of the HUD decision, however,
could overturn the project approval and all but scuttle the effort. For
this reason, judicial review of the NEPA cases has focused on the
evaluation of the agency decision as to whether it was arbitrary or
unreasonable after full consideration of environmental factors.2 4 It is
difficult to make a case for SAR. If it is assumed that the environmental information and analysis in the addendum to the EIS were adequate
to comply with NEPA, then the presumption must be that the HUD
decision was sufficiently based on environmental factors ignoring the
timing problem. If the EIS indicated insufficient environmental information, as argued here, then HUD did not have the facts or analysis and
is vulnerable to a showing of an arbitrary decision.
It was undisputed that the SAR development would cause some
pollution; the factual disagreement centered on how much and what
standards of judgment to employ. The HUD position was that: (1)
studies had failed to prove great damage to the aquifer; (2) the probable pollution (sewage leaks, storm runoff, soil percolation) would be
less than the no-action situation and also less than existing state and
local standards; and (3) required precautions and monitoring would
reduce the probability of a catastrophe to a minimum. The facts,
however, were that the danger was unknown and that the only studies
had been conducted by the SAR developer team.
67 exhibits, consisting of, inter alia, maps, letters and reports, which comprise appendices A and B.
Id. at 842.
242. Picher, Alternatives Under NEPA: The Function of Objectives in an Environmental Impact Statement, 11 HARV. J. LEGIS. 595, 607 (1974). NEPA ought to be read
as requiring consideration of all alternatives through which the relevant statutory, not

project, objective of the acting agency can be effected. Id. at 607.

243. E.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Envi-

ronmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engr., U.S. Army, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973).
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The important question to be addressed is whether, even assuming
that HUD had all the necessary information on which to base its
decision, did the inherent risks, however uncertain, exceed the advantages of the SAR project at its location? Regardless of the particular
standard of review or burden of proof chosen by a court, NEPA
ultimately requires some justification of the agency decision.24 4 Even
assuming a more complete and open analysis of alternatives by HUD for
the EIS, it is difficult to justify SAR at its site when a small amount
of pollution to the water supply was inevitable and a catastrophe possible, while reasonable alternatives that would satisfy agency objectives
appeared to exist. Not only were the implications of alternatives to
SAR not adequately explored and the environmental risks not studied
until after the major decision to approve SAR, but the balancing of the
benefits and the costs was apparently avoided by HUD even through the
time of the trial. This confrontation by the agency with the impact of
its actions is the heart of NEPA no matter what standard of judicial
2 45
review is employed.
In the Lynn decisions, emphasis was placed on the multitude of
studies and precautions adopted by HUD for the protection of the
environment from the SAR development.2 46 As admirable as these
efforts and precautions may have been, both courts wrongly confused
the institution of such palliatives with the "reasoned decision" process
that NEPA intends.24 7 What the protective measures did was to reduce
the risk of environmental damage--clearly the purpose of NEPA-but
in post hoc fashion after the decision to proceed with the project had
been made. 24 In such circumstances, the courts should have found the
decision lacking, by whatever standard, and should have ordered de
novo review of the SAR project costs and benefits in its ameliorated
state. Such an adaptive action as substantive review is definitely within
the spirit of NEPA and is warranted by the unusual case.
244. See Jordan, Alternatives Under NEPA: Toward an Accommodation, 3
ECOLOGY L.Q. 705, 742-43 (1973).
245. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir.
1971) where it is stated that "[i]f the decision was reached procedurally without individualized consideration and balancing of environmental factors . . . fully and in good faith
• . . it is the responsibility of the courts to reverse." See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)
(1970).
246. Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 832, 844, a!/'d in part, rev'd in part, 502 F.2d
43, 63 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994 (1975) (district court and court of
appeals discuss environmental protection).
247. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 353 (8th Cir.
1972).
248. See 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

21

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 8 [2022], No. 1, Art. 5

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 8:18

Substantive Review of HUD'sDecision

In judicial review under NEPA, there is a constant tension between
the courts' perceived needs: (1) to evaluate whether the actual balance
of costs and benefits that was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave
insufficient weight to environmental values, 249 and (2) not "to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. ' 250 The trend of judicial
review is toward a more literal reading of NEPA: that the action-forcing
provisions of section 102 are intended to implement the policy goals of
section 101, with environmental values taking their place in decision
making alongside the economic and technical considerations. 25' If this
is to be so, the courts must look beyond the appurtenances of the agency
decision in order to determine whether a decision was made for selfserving bureaucratic reasons or in pursuit of statutory objectives. One
appellate court has stated that "[gliven an agency obligation to carry
out the substantive requirements of the Act, we believe that courts have
an obligation to review substantive agency decisions on the merits. 252
HUD made no effort to set out the benefits to be gained by its
approval of SAR for Title VII guarantees, and did very little independent work in assessing the potential or probable environmental costs of
the project, until opposition and court action forced some concessions.
Although benefit-cost analysis for urban development projects probably
does not permit a rigorous, quantified analysis, 253 a decision on a project
like SAR must be justifiable in some organized manner, particularly
with respect to relevant alternatives of design, location, and means to the
desired objective. For SAR, HUD did not set out all the relevant
factors in its decision in any rational or comprehensive manner, and the
courts did not see fit to pursue the matter for review on the merits.
There is a possible caveat in the call for greater implementation of the
benefit-cost framework for judicial review of agency decisions. Because
the net economic and technical benefits of a proposed action are to be
weighed against environmental costs, which are frequently intangible
and indeterminable, the balancing process is vulnerable to introduction
249. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir.
1971).)
250. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
251. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B) (1970).
252. Environmental Defense Fund v.Corps of Engr., U.S. Army, 470 F.2d 289, 298
(8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,412 U.S. 931 (1973).

253. But see W. LETwIN, MUNICIPAL LAND BANKS: LAND RESERVE POLICY FOR URBAN DEVELOPMENT (1969); J. ROTHENBERG, ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF URBAN RENEWAL (1967); Lichfield, Cost-Benefit Analysis in City Planning, 26 J. AM. INST.
OF PLANNERS 273 (1960).
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of subjective and arbitrary factors by the agency.2 54 In addition, the
complexities of the technical analysis inherent in the type of benefit-cost
analysis may lie beyond the abilities of judges to apprehend and effectively review. In his concurrence to InternationalHarvester v. Ruckleshaus, 25 5 Judge Bazelon admitted that he did not "have the technical
25 6
know-how to agree or disagree with [the defendant's] evaluation.
But he envisaged a "new era in administrative law" for the environment
in which courts would require agencies "to establish a decision-making
process which assures a reasoned decision that can be held up to the
scrutiny of the scientific community and the public. '2 7 This is the
direction of substantive review of NEPA: judicial probing of the facts
and information that led to an agency decision in order to arrive at an
evaluation of that decision, with assistance of outside technical expertise.
TITLE VII AND

SAR

Although the SAR application to HUD was filed prior to the enactment of Title VII, its review and approval clearly are subject to the later
legislation.2 5
Title VII establishes a broad foundation for urban
growth policy in general and for the New Communities Program in
particular. Basic principles for national urban growth policy are set out
first, followed by a listing of undesirable growth trends at work in the
United States, and finally a number of eligibility criteria for new community assistance. 259 Since Title VII has not been tested in court, prior
to the Lynn case, it is not certain how well any new community project
must comport with the rather generalized criteria, trends, and principles.
SAR, or any other new community in the Title VII program, could
conceivably be challenged on compliance with these congressional statements. Each point of contention would require a detailed demonstration of how the community project fails to meet the eligibility criteria,
reverse the undesirable trends, and fulfill the growth policy principles.
This was the approach of the plaintiffs in Sierra Club v. Lynn, and the
attack met with a total rebuff from both courts.260 An agency apparently has great autonomy in interpreting its own statutory authority.
254. See Cohen & Warren, Judicial Recognition of the Substantive Requirements of
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 13 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 685, 698

(1972).
255.
256.
257.
258.

478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Id. at 651.
Id. at 652.
42 U.S.C. § 4529 (1970).

259. Id. §§ 4502(d), 4511(b), 4513.
260. Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 832, 838-40, aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 502
F.2d 43, 52-57 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994 (1975).
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The more interesting application of Title VII is its compatibility with
the NEPA interpretations discussed above, particularly with regard to the
matter of alternatives, as that issue, central to NEPA, also strikes at the
very heart of Title VII. There are two facets for consideration: (1)
alternatives to the site chosen for the project, and (2) alternatives to the
project itself for meeting policy objectives. Most HUD and other
federal offficials have been very conscious of the former, but almost
oblivious to the latter. Alternative site analysis has become quite common for all sorts of activities, including public housing, projects in
urban renewal areas, and the location of federal facilities. Alternatives
to the program itself, however, have never been an important agency
preoccupation because of bureaucratic compartmentalization, congressional mandates, and appropriations.
Some HUD programs have routinely included the analysis of alternative sites in terms both of HUD policy objectives and of other applicable
statutory policy. Two pre-NEPA cases added firm dimensions to the
evaluation of alternative sites.2 6' Both cases involved the conflict of
explicit HUD goals, and actions pursuant thereto, with the Civil Rights
Acts of 1964 262 and 1968.263 The site selection for the multi-family
housing projects in the two cases, one in Chicago, the other in Philadelphia, was presumably beneficial from the point of view of HUD's
statutory missions of providing housing for poor people, but the sites
also had the recognized effect of'increasing racial concentration in the
subject areas, in violation of the civil rights statutes. Both appellate
courts refused to permit HUD to follow the politically safest path in
providing low-income housing, that is, by further segregation; instead, it
was held that HUD had a duty at least to include factors related to the
other statutory concerns in its decision calculus. In Shannon v. HUD 214
the court stated:
The defendants assert that HUD has broad discretion to choose
between alternative methods of achieving the national housing objectives set forth in the several applicable statutes. They argue
that this broad discretion permitted HUD in this case to make an
unreviewable choice between alternative types of housing. We
agree that broad discretion may be exercised. But that discretion
must be exercised within the framework of the national policy
261. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971) (public housing); Shannon
v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970) (urban renewal).
262. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-2000h-6 (1970).
263.

42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1970).

264. 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970).
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against discrimination in federally assisted housing . . . and in
favor of fair housing.26

In a pre-NEPA atmosphere, the court demanded that HUD establish a
broader decision-making process to incorporate socio-economic variables relevant to compliance with civil rights law. The introduction of
NEPA into HUD has furthered the multiple-policy consciousness of
Gautreaux v. Romney, 26 6 and Shannon by its focus on the natural and
26 7
human environment in agency decision making.
Title VII both strengthens and weakens this decision process. As
with other programs, wholly alternative actions to achieve its ends are
not readily considered. But the legislation stipulates many different
policy concerns for new communities development, including preservation and enhancement of the natural and urban environment, provision
of opportunities for minority group members, and advancement of the
nation's housing supply.268 These encompass a wide range of national
policies, leaving little ambiguity for judicial interpretation as in Gautreaux and Shannon.
But the matter of alternative sites for new communities is different for
Title VII and other programs where the initiative comes from a private
applicant, who already has the site for the new community, as well as
the basic parameters of design and function, to present for HUD's
acceptance or rejection. Cooperation between the applicant and HUD
can alter many of the parameters to make them fit the Title VII
guidelines, regulations, and legislation, but one that cannot be altered is
the site, the control of which is so important in new community development as to be the original impetus for some developers to seek Title VII
assistance. As presently constituted, the New Communities 'Program
cannot expect a developer, especially in the private sector, to hold
several alternative sites throughout the protracted HUD review so that
HUD can choose the best. Yet that is what Gautreaux, Shannon, and
the NEPA interpretations suggested in this article seem to demand-not
only that alternatives, especially sites, be considered by HUD, but also
that HUD be prepared to reject an application if the environmental and
social costs outweigh project benefits or even if an alternative site were
265. Id. at 819.
266. 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971).
267. See Durchslag & Junger, HUD and the Human Environment: A Preliminary
Analysis of the Impact of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 Upon the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 58 IOWA L. REV. 805, 836-42 (1973).
268. 42 U.S.C. § 4511f (1970).
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significantly superior in fulfilling the far-reaching Title VII principles
and objectives.
Such is clearly not the case now, nor was it for SAR. But the impact
of this omission has even been worse-without alternatives, HUD tends
to evaluate new community applications in a vacuum, ending up with
inoffensive but insipid new communities that pass the multi-faceted
review by not seriously violating any policy objectives, but at the same
time without positively fulfilling any objectives. HUD's "path of least
resistance" response to the expanding range of policy concerns has led to
the approval of such mediocre new communities under Title VII that
everyone concerned has become disillusioned with the program's lack of
success, in terms of its goals as well as financial feasibility, and would
prefer termination of the program to further embarrassments.
The alternatives provision that is so pivotal to the NEPA gives some
directions for salvaging such programs as Title VII from the abyss of
negativism and mediocrity that threatens their existence. Attempts to
make a pre-selected assistance program on a pre-selected site optimize
policy objectives and have proved to be fruitless at least in the New
Communities Program. NEPA, with its broad goals and expansive
interpretation, can provide a potentially useful framework for improving
the Title VII process and product.
Implementation of NEPA and Title VII
Similar to NEPA, the role of objectives in defining the range and type
of alternatives for an agency to consider can be applied to Title VII as a
judicially reviewable framework by which agency decisions can be
made. The Title VII legislation includes an imposing array of goals,
principles, and criteria generally concerning the improvement of urban
development. Even the more specific standards for new community
assistance are based on a myriad of congressional objectives. 2 9 None
of these, of course, can be fulfilled entirely by any one or series of new
communities. The point is that these objectives can best be realized by
a broad attack on the urban problems they represent, which is the raison
d'etre of federal urban policy and which can only be conducted if the
whole spectrum of federal programs are coordinated to produce the
most effective results.
What this implies is that for any urban area some federal coordinating
agency should recommend the best set of programs to combat the
269. See 42 U.S.C. § 4513 (1970).
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perceived problems in the area. Although such super-coordination is
perhaps an unreasonable expectation, a balanced review and program
implementation is quite credible at the agency level. HUD itself has
many different funded programs besides new communities at its disposal
or its influence. HUD should be able to focus on an urban area's
problems vis-a-vis Title VII objectives and then find an ameliorative
solution from its available instruments. As shown in the SAR case, the
problems of low-income housing and minority opportunity, not to mention environmental fragility, were important to San Antonio but were
not well treated by the SAR project. A better solution might have
been: (1) SAR with an altered plan, (2) a new community at a
different location, perhaps on surplus federal lands, (3) several major
housing projects in lieu of a new community, or (4) more downtown
urban redevelopment.
These alternatives all relate to the statutory objectives of Title VII,
and all lie within HUD's general purview. This is not to contend,
however, that HUD has an equal ability to fund all such projects or to
initiate them. But the interesting aspect is that the question of alternative sites and alternative programs blend together in the pursuit of
objectives, and the confluence falls within the evolving scope of NEPA.
The broader view by agencies is not only going to be required by courts
under the NEPA, but it may also lead to a more effective application of
resources to fulfill statutory objectives.2 7"
The second approach to implementing alternatives consideration under Title VII involves the institution of fixed standards by which new
community applications from the private sector could be evaluated. The
"performance" of an applicant's project would then be measured by the
extent to which it accomplishes the objectives implicit in the standards.
These standards could be varied by area to reflect local problems and
priorities. The standards could include the environmental-location accessible to minority communities, housing mix related to area needs,
2 71
and other factors derived from Title VII objectives.
The use of standards would be fairer for developer-applicants, who
could know beforehand, the strengths and weaknesses of their own
projects, so that post hoc review, including judicial review under NEPA,
would not delay and destroy the project feasibility. The fixed nature of
270. See Picher, Alternatives Under NEPA: The Function of Objectives in an
Environmental Impact Statement, 11 HAdv. J. LEGIS. 595, 604 (1974).
271. See Gillespie, Industrial Zoning and Beyond: Compatibility Through Perform-

ance Standards, 46 J. URuAN L. 723 (1969) (zoning performance standards).
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the standards may strike some as inflexible and bureaucratic, especially
when flexible discretionary standards represent reform from past rigidities, but the agency review would permit the cross-comparisons of new
communities with other program actions and assist in determining the
best solution for local problems, as well as more rigorous review under
NEPA in court. To some extent the detailed HUD guidelines for new
community applications already incorporate many such standards, but
these have been added incrementally, without standardization with other
programs, and actually only represent minimum qualifications, mostly
procedural, with all important review retained in HUD's discretion.
A final approach for Title VII might be termed an adversary arrangement, in which HUD would utilize its assistance programs to fund local
and regional agencies to conduct new community planning in their areas
both before and during applications under Title VII. 27 2 Ex ante planning would be only a slight extension of normal development planning,
applied to the identification of needs, sites, and design for new communities in any urban area, presumably based on HUD criteria. Such
planning, notably missing from SAR, would provide the frame of reference, as well as documented rationale, for evaluation of new community
applications once made. Funds for local planning during an application's review would be aimed at increasing the local area's capability to
respond rationally to the proposal and to plan for the inevitable implementation of the new community, if approved.
The purpose of assistance for planning is to create a local advocate
that can articulate opposition in constructive terms, related to Title VII
objectives and local needs. Such advocacy can have the effect of
"analyzing" the proposed project with respect to possible alternatives
by
countering benefits with perceived costs in an adversary balancing
test. 273 Although the process and results are unpredictable, planning
assistance can act to institutionalize and rationalize debate, especially
where other mechanisms are absent.
Other types of improvements could certainly be suggested, but the
three above derive directly from the SAR experience, the evolving
directions of NEPA interpretation, and the needs of Title VII with
regard to new communities. The proposed measures indicate ways in
which NEPA, as an innovation in the decision-making process, can
272. E.g., 40 U.S.C. § 461 (1970); Housing and Community Development Act of
1974, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5301-17 (Supp. 1976).

273. This is similar to what Judge Bazelon called for in International Harvester Co,
v, Rvckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615? 650-53 (D.C. Cir, 1973).
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serve the realization of Title VII objectives, and remove some of the
incompatibility as revealed by the SAR case. Neither act has been fully
implemented, but together they can further the ends for which they were
created.
CONCLUSION

As it happens, SAR was more in concert with Title VII objectives as
they related to San Antonio's problems than either the plaintiffs or the
above discussion would seem to credit. It was a reasonable answer to
the runaway problem of urban sprawl in the area. It was essentially a
good proposal in the wrong place. Such an accident, however, should
not excuse the careless decision making and the myopic process by
which SAR was approved. SAR was never part of an area-wide approach to urban growth problems; it was never linked to comprehensive
efforts to protect the Edwards Aquifer as a vital natural resource.
Alternatives were never seriously considered, and the costs of potential
environmental damage were never weighed against benefits which might
accrue from SAR.
Ironically, although the goals and procedures of NEPA and Title VII
were deeply compromised in the SAR review and approval, the implementation of those acts still greatly improved the SAR project incrementally over the years until its final legal vindication. The scientific
studies and the protective measures introduced for SAR not only lowered the probability of pollution damage but also serve as a model for
other developments to follow. The Title VII regulations as they were
introduced brought forth much analysis of the impact of SAR on San
Antonio and much cooperation with local officials. These effects were
directly due to the advent of NEPA and Title VII, and of the form of
judicial review that has come to symbolize and enforce at least the
former. Not only was the admittedly inadequate final EIS completely
redone in order to achieve compliance, making the case, according to
the trial judge, "an entirely different lawsuit," 274 but the attention and
publicity surrounding the case also awoke great concern for the aquifer,
culminating in more stringent land use controls and a campaign to
acquire undeveloped portions of the recharge zone. The suit itself
induced these and other changes.
274. Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834, 850 (W..D. Tex. 1973), aff'd in part,

rev'd in part, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994 (1975).
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The problems of HUD's performance on SAR, especially those relating to alternatives and the maximization of benefits over costs, appear to
be inherent in programs wherein ,the initiative derives from the private
applicant. The nature of the relationship either virtually precludes a
sufficient and reasoned decision process on the part of the federal
agency, or, if NEPA is fully implemented, it may make untenable the
participation of private enterprise. Even with the introduction of the
improvements suggested above, HUD or any other agency cannot really
exercise, as to outside initiatives, the sort of decision-making that the
NEPA at least is beginning to demand-that is, full consideration and
explication of environmental factors and a resulting rational decision.
Conversely, private developers, with their fragile balances of cash flow
and timing, cannot be expected to be attracted by the delays and
uncertainties of a reasoned federal decision process. SAR, for example,
because of the time and cost losses, may be doomed by its "success"
in being approved and exonerated.
The NEPA provisions, if fully implemented, will tend to make federal
agencies more responsible for their own actions, and more cautious in
their activities. One likely victim is the public-private partnership
implicit in programs like the New Communities Program. If objectives
like those of Title VII are to be realized, agency initiative will have to be
substituted which may cause less federally sponsored developmental
activity to occur under existing legislation or may induce new programs
with less delegated responsibility. In either event, the result is likely to
be greater ability on the part of the federal agency to accomplish policy
objectives in the areas of urban growth and the environment, as based
on the stringent demands of NEPA for rational and open decision
processes.
The SAR case was an important milestone in the development of a
more mature and sophisticated federal decision-making process that
conforms with NEPA. The battle itself was lost, but the war was
perhaps a victory. And the outcome might be very different today.
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